Reformasi in Malaysia and Indonesia

Reformasi in Malaysia and Indonesia

In 1998 Indonesia and Malaysia struggled for democratic transition. Under the same slogan of “reformasi” (reform), popular discontent in both countries turned into calls for political change. In Indonesia, political tumult began with the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis that deeply effected socio-economic fundamentals, and led to widespread social unrest. The government’s inability to deal with the crisis weakened the regime’s credibility. The same economic crisis - albeit to a lesser extent - meanwhile affected the national economy in Malaysia. Protests escalated, however, when Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was dismissed by the Malaysian Prime Minister and leader of a Malay-based ruling party UMNO (United Malays Nation Organisation). Nevertheless, the reform movement in Malaysia waned quickly and was unable to bring down Mahatir. On the contrary, the severe economic downturn, decreased support from elites, and tension within the military, underpinned by a massive peoples’ movement enabled the reform movement in Indonesia to oust the longest-standing Indonesian president, Suharto.



This essay will answer the question: why were reformasi protests successful in bringing about a change of government in Indonesia but not in Malaysia? Firstly, I will look at the nature of the political regime in each country, before discussing the nature of their respective oppositions. I will argue that differences in their opposition movements stemmed from the nature of the political regime in Malaysia that depends on electoral contest to change the government ultimately did not succeed to bring down the government.

The Indonesian political regime prior to reformasi can be seen as authoritarian, with its survival reliant on excessive control of civil liberties, the politicisation of the military through a ‘dual function’ doctrine, and the construction of patronage networks with business people through rent-seeking relationships. Moreover, in terms of political legitimacy, the authoritarian leader, Suharto, did not allow any opposition parties to challenge his presidency. Other parties were permitted, but deep intervention from the Suharto government impeded their potential threat.

In contrast, even though the semi-democratic Malaysian regime limited civil liberties, opposition parties were permitted to compete in regularly held elections. The regime did not interfere with these opposition parties organisationally in order to weaken their power. In other words, competitiveness was not banned but was limited. Case noted that the semi-democratic regime may stabilise more readily than authoritarianism as the “national leader has forged stronger ties to elites and social constituent” (2001, 9). This impacts on its political legitimacy as the authoritarian regime depended on raw economic growth rather than electoral victory as in the semi-democratic regime (Case 2001, 9). Case’s analysis of the two regime types can be useful in analysing the different political developments in Indonesia and Malaysia during their reform periods.

A consequence of these differing regime types is a fundamental difference in the nature of their opposition movements. The emergence of an opposition can be linked to the process of modernisation, which brings about a growing urban middle-class. In the authoritarian regime, the growing middle-class plays a crucial role in ending the regime as the absence of opposition parties leaves the responsibility for political change in the hands of non-state actors. On the contrary, a semi-democratic regime allows opposition parties to exist. Limited political space, and the government’s ability to control state resources, however, prohibits them from gaining more control.

In Indonesia the middle-class did not pose a serious challenge to the Suharto regime as they mostly worked in the government bureaucracy. Business people were mostly ethnic Chinese who needed to build rent-seeking relations with government in order to enhance their businesses. Minority groups within society also came into being, most notably in the form of autonomous organisations that advocated for the various interests which the regime failed to articulate. Unlike Indonesia, where political parties were subject to forced loyalty, opposition in Malaysia came from inside and outside the state. A middle-class, of both Malay and Chinese background, grew rapidly during the economic prosperity of the 1980s. Economic privileges towards ethnic Malays through the New Economic Policy, however, gave rise to the proliferation of NGOs (non-governmental organisations) that were mostly headed by people of non-Malay background.

According to the transition theory literature, economic difficulties can lead to the beginning of regime change (Gill 2000, 10). For an authoritarian regime whose legitimacy depends on raw economic growth, its inability to deal with economic downturn can delegitimise the regime’s credentials. The reform movement in Indonesia began with the economic crisis in 1997 that led to state bankruptcy. At the elite level division was inevitable, with some Islamic modernists, coming mostly from ICMI (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) turnin against Suharto. They were followed by business conglomerates whose businesses were significantly affected by the economic crisis. At the mass level, economic hardship escalated social grievances into outright violence. Malaysian domestic politics was similarly affected by the economic crisis, and consequent elite strain within the government. Mahatir’s plan to grant government bail-outs to protect national business elites was challenged by Anwar Ibrahim’s recovery campaign. This tension culminated in Mahatir’s sacking of Anwar Ibrahim as Deputy Minister. The economic crisis in Malaysia did not impact dramatically on the mass level. The growing resistance from the community was likely due to the scandalous removal of Anwar Ibrahim. Criticism was directed towards Mahatir’s authoritarian leadership by equating him with Suharto, deriding the practice of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) within the government, and urges to lift the restrictions on civil liberties. Here it is important to underscore the difference of the impact of the economic crisis on regime legitimacy in Malaysia and Indonesia. The inability of the Indonesian government to deal with economic crisis worsened the political situation and delegitimised its credentials, whereas in Malaysia the economic crisis only had a slight impact on the country.

Civil society plays a significant role in bringing down a regime. The differing characteristics of civil society opposition in Malaysia and Indonesia also effected the different outcome. Even though civil society was flourishing in Malaysia, its presence was tainted by racial division. In addition, opposition parties such as the Democratic Action Party and Partai Islam SeMalaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party) used racial identity to appeal to the popular mass. In Indonesia, civil society emerged due to the state’s failure to articulate the interests of groups within society. The hostile attitude that the Suharto regime showed towards various groups in society did not result in a predominant ethnic group. Indeed, during his tenure, the Suharto government implemented an informal policy of Javanisation which resulted in center-periphery discontent. This policy, however, was not carried out in a way that uplifted the Javanese ethnic group at large. Rather it reflected Suharto’s personal vision for a sultanate leadership. A robust civil society that engaged in the precipitating reform movement can be seen as an outcome of social grievance that resulted from long-term repression.

The opposition movement in Indonesia, as distinctly characterised as described above, was able to bring about government change. Preceded by severe economic catastrophe, which led to elite strain, underpinned by a robust civil society, political reform in Indonesia was inevitable. On the contrary, the semi-democratic regime in Malaysia, chiefly charaterised by limited competition but the existence of opposition parties resulted in an integrated opposition and electoral process. As Aspinall suggested elections are still seen as the most appropriate way to change government (2005, 250). In addition, the lesser impact of the Malaysian economic crisis on society was not enough to threaten the regime’s credibility. Mahatir’s manoeuvre to protect the national bourgeoisie meant he did not lose elite support, rather than opt for a financial austerity that would ruin the patronage networks between business elites and his cronies.




Bibliography

Aspinall, Edward. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Case, William. 2002. Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less. London: Roudledge Curzon.

Gill, Graeme. 2000. The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and Transition Process. New York: St Martin Press Inc.